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ANOTHER STEP TOWARDS ENDING
DISCRIMINATION IN THE JURY SELECTION
PROCESS-Powers v. Ohio
I. INTRODUCTION
With the April 1, 1991 decision in Powers v. Ohio,1 the United
States Supreme Court took another step towards ending discrimi-
nation in the jury selection process by broadening the holding of
Batson v. Kentucky.2 For the thirty year period between the deci-
sions in Swain v. Alabama3 in 1965, and Batson,4 in 1986, the
Court permitted prosecutors to use peremptory challenges 5 in aiy
criminal case to exclude members of a racial minority from petit
jury 6 service. Both Swain and Batson involved attempts by black
defendants to prove purposeful discrimination by prosecutors
against black venirepersons7 during the voir dire process.8 In addi-
tion, both cases required that the defendant had to be of the same
race or minority as the excluded venireperson in order for the ex-
clusionary action to be found unconstitutional.
In Batson, the Court attacked discrimination in the jury selec-
tion process by holding that whenever a criminal defendant estab-
lishes a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the prose-
cutor, the burden shifts to that prosecutor to show a non-racial,
non-discriminatory ground for his peremptory challenge.9 In Pow-
1. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
4. Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. A peremptory challenge is the right to challenge a juror without assigning
a reason for the challenge. In most jurisdictions, each party to an action, both
civil and criminal, has a specified number of such challenges and after using all
his peremptory challenges he is required to furnish a reason for subsequent chal-
lenges. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 592 (5th ed. 1983).
6. Petit jury is the ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action; so
called to distinguish it from the grand jury. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (6th ed.
1990).
7. Also known as "venireman": a member of a panel of jurors; a prospective
juror. Before becoming a juror, a person must pass voir dire examination. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22; Batson, 476 U.S. at 81.
9. Batson, 476 U.S. at 90.
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ers, the Supreme Court extended the Batson rule, holding "that a
criminal defendant may object to [the] race-based exclusion of ju-
rors effected through peremptory challenges whether or not the
defendant and the excluded juror share the same race."1 The
Powers Court based this decision on the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.
This Note has four objectives. First, this Note will review the
constitutional history behind Powers, involving racially motivated
discrimination in the jury selection process. Second, this Note will
analyze and discuss the Powers decision. Third, this Note will at-
tempt to ascertain the impact of the decision. Finally, this Note
will suggest that while Powers marks progress in the right direc-
tion, there are other important questions that need to be resolved
before the jury selection process will be totally free from
discrimination.1
II. THE CASE
Defendant, Larry Joe Powers, a white male, was indicted on
two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder in
Franklin County, Ohio. Powers pleaded not guilty and exercised
his right to a jury trial.1 2 He objected when the State exercised
peremptory challenges to exclude seven black venirepersons from
the jury.1 3 He also requested that the trial court compel the prose-
cutor to explain, on the record, his reasons for excluding these per-
sons. 4 The trial court denied the request and Powers was con-
victed on all counts and was sentenced to prison for a term of 53
years to life.15 Powers appealed his conviction to the Ohio Court of
Appeals."6 He argued that the prosecution's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges violated his Sixth Amendment guarantee to
a fair cross-section of the community in his petit jury and voiced
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. 7 Powers contended that the fact that he was white and the
excluded venirepersons were black was irrelevant to his right to
10. 111 S. Ct. at 1365 (1991) (emphasis added).
11. See B. Discriminatory Practices Not Addressed, infra.
12. 111 S. Ct. at 1366.
13. 111 S. Ct. at 1364.
14. 111 S. Ct. at 1366.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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object to the prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptories.1 8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, and the
Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Powers' appeal on the ground
that the case did not raise a substantial constitutional question.1 9
Powers sought review before the United States Supreme
Court. 0 While his petition for certiorari was pending, the Court
decided Holland v. Illinois," holding that the Sixth Amendment
did not restrict the exclusion of a defendant's racial group at the
peremptory challenge stage." However, in dicta, five members of
the Court stated that "a defendant might be able to make the ob-
jection on equal protection grounds."23 After the Holland decision,
the Court granted the petitioners writ of certiorari, but limited it
to the question of "whether, based on the Equal Protection Clause,
a white defendant may object to the prosecution's peremptory
challenges of black venirepersons. "24
III. BACKGROUND
A. Early Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process in
General
Prior to the Civil War, there was widespread discrimination in
the jury selection process in the United States. During this period,
many black citizens were denied the "significant opportunity to
participate in civil life" that jury service afforded its citizens.2 5 Fol-
lowing the war, however, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 made it a
criminal offense to exclude persons from jury service because of
their race.26 However, despite the Act, widespread discriminatory
practices were still effectuated through the use of peremptory'
challenges.
The Supreme Court first applied the Fourteenth Amendment
to the jury selection process in Strauder v. West Virginia.2 7 In its
decision, the Court held a West Virginia statute which limited
18. Id.
19. 111 S. Ct. at 1366-67.
20. 111 S. Ct. at 1367.
21. 493 U.S. 47.4 (1990).
22. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1367.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 111 S. Ct. at 1365; Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
26. 111 S. Ct. at 1365.
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1888).
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petit and grand jury service to white men to be invalid.28 The opin-
ion of the Court stated that this type of discrimination "is practi-
cally a brand upon. . .[blacks], affixed by the law, an assertion of
their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others." 9 The Court found the
absolute exclusion of blacks from the venire, and ultimately the
petit jury, was an easy opportunity to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, but the exclusion of blacks
by peremptory challenges would raise a much more problematic
issue.30
B. Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges: Swain to
Batson
Federal and state laws provide for two types of challenges to
eliminate potential jurors: a challenge for cause and a peremptory
challenge.3 1 A challenge for cause must be explained. 3 The pe-
remptory challenge is a device which enables counsel to strike a
predetermined number of jurors from the jury panel without offer-
ing an explanation.3
The peremptory challenge has historically been a part of the
United States legal system and is not without its advantages.3 " It
has been a means of "winnowing out" possible sympathies and an-
tagonisms so that the jury will be as fair as possible. 5 However,
peremptories have historically been used to effectuate discrimina-
tion in the selection of jurors. This is because the use of the term
"peremptory" implies that the challenge may be exercised under
28. 100 U.S. at 310.
29. 100 U.S. at 308.
30. Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments - The Swain Song of the Ra-
cially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 821, 822 (1986).
31. Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal
Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227 (1986).
32. In most jurisdictions, each party to the litigation, in addition to a certain
number of peremptory challenges, has the -right to challenge a juror by furnishing
a satisfactory reason why such juror should not be seated such as bias or knowl-
edge of the case. Unlike the peremptory challenge for which no reason need be
given, the party challenging a juror for cause must satisfy the trial judge that his
reasons are compelling. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (5th ed. 1983).
33. Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 685, 527 A.2d 332, 334 (1987).
34. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
35. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1378 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the complete discretion of its user and will not be subject to the
court's control.3 6 Therefore, a conflict arose between the need for
selecting an impartial jury that peremptories fulfill and the protec-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. 7 This conflict was first ad-
dressed in 1965 in the Swain v. Alabama case. 8
1. The Swain Case
In Swain, the "struck jury system" procedure was chal-
lenged .3 This procedure allowed both the defense and prosecution
a certain number of peremptory challenges. ° Both sides would al-
ternate challenges or "strikes" until a venire of 35 people in non-
capital cases was narrowed to twelve jurors."' The defendant in
Swain, a black man, alleged that the prosecutor used his peremp-
tory challenges to systematically remove all black members from
the venire, thus resulting in an all white jury.42 The defendant's
position was supported by the fact that, between 1950 and 1965, no
black had served on any petit jury in the county, despite the fact
that black men comprised almost twenty-six percent of the
county's population. 3 In Swain, the venire contained eight blacks,
and two were excused, while the other six were removed through
the prosecutor's use of peremptories."1
The Court in Swain found no constitutional requirement for
the prosecutor to reveal his reasons for using a peremptory chal-
lenge, and went on to state that there is a "presumption in any
particular case. . . that the prosecutor is using the state's chal-
lenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the
court.""5 This presumption was not overcome in Swain. However,
the Court did attempt to deal with the conflict between the need
for peremptory challenges in the jury selection process and the
guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. "6 The Court refused to
permit an equal protection claim based on a pattern of jury strikes
36. Chew, 527 A.2d at 334.
37. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 221-222.
40. Id. at 209-210.
41. Id. at 210.
42. Id.
43. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 221-22.
46. Id. at 226-27.
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in a particular case. 7 However, the Court held that a prosecutor
might violate the Equal Protection Clause through the use of pe-
remptory challenges if, in case after case, regardless of the circum-
stances, he is responsible for the removal of black venirepersons
who have survived challenges for cause with the result that no ne-
groes ever serve on petit juries.48
2. The Interim
Following this case, several states attempted to avoid the
Swain decision. In People v. Wheeler49 and Commonwealth v.
Soares, 0 the state of California and the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, respectively, attempted to use state constitutions to avoid
the Swain decision. In Wheeler, the Supreme Court of California
held that Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution guar-
anteed the right to a verdict given by "impartial and unprejudiced
jurors. ' 51 The court held that the right to have a jury picked from
a cross-section of the population is guaranteed by both the Sixth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution and the California Consti-
tution.2 The court concluded that removing venirepersons on the
sole basis of group bias violates the right to a trial by a jury repre-
senting a cross-section of the community. 3
In Soares, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that pe-
remptory challenges could not be utilized to "exclude members of
discrete groups solely on the basis of bias presumed to derive from
[an] individual's membership in the group. . . ."' In both the
Wheeler and the Soares opinions, the courts noted that their hold-
ings would apply equally to the use of peremptories by both the
prosecution and the defense.5 5 Other states also used the Wheeler
and Soares rationales to avoid the severe standard of the Swain
47. Id. at 223.
48. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965).
49. 583 P.2d 748 (1978).
50. 387 N.E.2d 499 (1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
51. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 754.
52. Id. at 265.
53. Id. at 276-77.
54. 387 N.E.2d at 516; Note, Batson v. Kentucky: One Step Short of Halting
The Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 267, 274
(1989).
55. Note, Batson v. Kentucky: One Step Short of Halting The Discrimina-
tory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 U. TOL. L. REV 267, 274 (1989).
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decision. 6
3. The Batson Case
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case of Batson v.
Kentucky. 7 Batson re-examined the portion of Swain v. Alabama
regarding the evidentiary burden placed on the criminal defendant
who claims that he has been denied equal protection through the
State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his
race from the petit jury. 8 Batson involved the conviction of a
black defendant by an all white jury on charges of second-degree
burglary and receiving stolen goods. 9 The prosecutor removed all
four black venirepersons through the use of peremptory challenges
and the defendant was ultimately convicted.60 The defendant ap-
pealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, arguing
that the prosecutor's conduct violated his rights under the Sixth
Amendment and the Kentucky Constitution, Section 11, which
guaranteed a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.6'
That court rejected the defendant's argument and pointed out that
it had recently followed the decision in Swain.2
The Supreme Court of the United States granted the defend-
ant's writ of certiorari which stated that his rights were violated
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.63 The Court re-ex-
amined the portion of Swain regarding the evidentiary burden
placed on the criminal defendant who claims that he has been de-
nied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude members of his race from the petit jury." The
Court held that a criminal defendant can raise a challenge under
the Equal Protection Clause to the use of peremptories at his own
trial by showing that the prosecutor used them for the purpose of
excluding members of the defendant's race. 5
56. See State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (N.M. 1980); Riley v. State, 496
A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 1022 (1986); State v. Gilmore, 489
A.2d 1175 (N.J. 1985).
57. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
58. Id. at 122.
59. Id. at 82.
60. Id at 83.
61. Id.
62. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1986).
63. Id. at 91.
64. Id. at 82
65. Id. at 96.
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The Court's reasoning was two-fold. First, it stated that under
Strauder, discrimination in the venire selection process violates a
defendant's right to equal protection because the protection that
trial by jury is intended to insure is denied. 6 The Court held that
this principle applied to the jury selection process from the ve-
nire.6 7 The second half of the Court's rationale focused on the
standard of proof required of the defendant to make out a prima
facie case of discrimination in the venire selection process. 8 The
Court identified several requirements that the defendant must
meet in order to satisfy his burden of proof. First, the defendant.
had to be of the same race a the excluded venireperson.6 9 Second,
the defendant had to prove either (1) that the prosecutor had sys-
tematically excluded members of the defendant's race from venires
over a period of time, or (2) that the members of his race were
substantially under-represented in the venire7 0 Finally, the de-
fendant had to show that the method of choosing the venire pro-
vided the potential for discrimination.7 1 The Court concluded that
because the defendant could question the venire selection process
in his own case, that the same right should be extended to peremp-
tory challenges. 72 The specific test formulated by the Court in Bat-
son is as follows:
To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is
a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor
has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to
rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that pe-
remptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that per-
mits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Fi-
nally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on ac-
count of their race.73
The basis for whether such an inference is created is derived from
the circumstances surrounding the use of the peremptory challenge
66. Id. at 84.
67. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986).
68. Id. at 89.
69. Id. at 94-96.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
73. Id.
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during the voir dire."' The judge in each case must decide thisissue."5
The Court went on to hold that after a prima facie case of
discrimination is proven by the defendant, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor to produce a non-racial explanation for his use of the
peremptory challenge.76 The explanation need not rise to the level
necessary for a challenge for cause, but denial is not sufficient. 77
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Powers: One More Blow to Discrimination in Jury Selection
Five years after deciding Batson, the Supreme Court was
asked by petitioner Larry Joe Powers to extend its holding in Bat-
son to prevent race-based exclusions of jurors through the prosecu-
tors use of peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant
and the excluded jurors shared the same race.7 8 During the course
of the jury selection in his Ohio state court trial for aggravated
murder and related offenses, Powers, a white man, objected to the
prosecutor's use of peremptories to exclude seven black venireper-
sons from the jury, based on the holding in Batson.7 9 Power's ob-
jection's were overruled and he was convicted on several counts.80
The trial court's ruling was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court,
and Powers submitted a writ for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.81
While the defendant's writ was pending, the Court decided
Holland v. Illinois, which held that the Sixth amendment did not
restrict the exclusion of a racial group at the peremptory challenge
stage of jury selection.82 However, five members of the Court
stated that a defendant might be able to make the objection on
Equal Protection grounds.8 3 Following the Holland decision, the
Court granted certiorari to Powers. The writ was granted to deter-
mine the question of whether, "based on the Equal Protection
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
78. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1365 (1991).
79. Id. at 1366.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1367.
82. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476 (1990).
83. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
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Clause, a white defendant may object to the prosecution's peremp-
tory challenges of black venirepersons."8
The Court extended Batson and held that a criminal defend-
ant could object to race-based exclusions of jurors through the use
of peremptory challenges, regardless of whether their race coin-
cided with the race of the excluded venirepersons 86 Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy stated that Batson 'was designed to
serve multiple ends,' only one of which was to protect individual
defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors."86 The
Court found that Batson also "recognized that a prosecutor's dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the excluded ju-
rors and the community at large" by denying them the right to
participate in the administration of justice. The Court rejected
the contention of the State that the holding be limited to the cir-
cumstances in Batson "and that in equal protection analysis the
race of the objecting defendant constitutes a relevant precondition
for a Batson challenge." 8 The State of Ohio argued that because
Powers was white he could not object to the exclusion of blacks.89
The Court reasoned that this limitation would conform neither
with "accepted rules of standing to raise a constitutional claim nor
with the substantive guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause
and the policies underlying federal statutory law"." Furthermore,
the Court stated that the very fact that members of a particular
race are singled out and expressly denied the right of jury partici-
pation because of their skin color "is practically a brand upon
them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority." 91
The Court also reasoned that Batson recognized that a prose-
cutor's "discriminatory use of peremptories harms the excluded ju-
rors by depriving them of a significant opportunity to participate
in civil life."'92 In addition, the Court found that Congress had ad-
dressed discriminatory selection of jurors by passing federal stat-
84. Id.
85. Id at 1368.
86. Id. (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam) (quot-
ing Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 3243, 329 (1980)).
87. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 87 (1986)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1369 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
92. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87).
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utes that prohibit such behavior. 3 Included in these statutes was
the Civil Rights Act of 1875."' The Court further stated that al-
though a citizen does not -have the right to sit on any particular
jury, he is entitled to not be excluded because of his race alone .5
The Court went on to reject, on equal protection grounds, the ar-
gument that no "particular stigma or dishonor" results if a prose-
cutor uses skin color alone to determine a prospective juror's objec-
tivity.9 6 Furthermore, the Court held that race-based peremptories
were not permissible, even when visited upon members of all races
in equal degree.91
The Court also considered whether a criminal defendant has
standing to raise the equal protection rights of a juror excluded
from service in violation of these principles. 8 The Court reasoned
that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prose-
cution causes a criminal defendant "cognizable injury," and that
the defendant has a concrete interest in challenging the practice."'
The jury acts as a vital check against wrongful exercise of power by
the state and its prosecutors.' °0 The Court found "[a] prosecutor's
wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory challenge
to be a constitutional violation committed in open court at the out-
set of the proceedings.''0
The Court reasoned that this effects the composition of the
trier of fact itself and the irregularity may pervade all the proceed-
ings that follow. 1 2 Furthermore, the Court stated that the purpose
to the jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and
the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal
is.given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair.'0 3 The
Court gave further support for the notion that a criminal defend-
ant had standing, regardless of his race, to assert the right of a
wrongfully excluded venireperson because that venireperson had
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id at 1365.
96. Id.
97. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 136 (1991).
98. Id. at 1370.
99. Id. at 1372; See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986).
100. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S 79, 87 (1986).
101. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1371.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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no likelihood or ability to assert their own rights.104
In holding that race is irrelevant to a defendant's standing to
object to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the
Court took another step towards removing discrimination from the
jury selection process. In doing so, the Court not only insured that
the accused would have a fair trial, but also furthered the opportu-
nities for citizens to have a chance to perform their civic duties by
participating in the justice process through jury duty.
B. Discriminatory Practices Not Addressed
Powers most certainly is a step towards removing discrimina-
tion from the jury selection process. However, some questions re-
main unanswered following this case. Two questions this Note will
address are (1) whether the decision in Powers, including the ra-
tionale of Batson, apply to defense counsel and (2) whether Powers
covers other minorities not based on race
1. Application to Defense Counsel
The Court did not address whether their holding in Powers
extends to defense counsel's use of peremptory challenges. Follow-
ing the Court's rationale for extending the Batson decision to ap-
ply regardless of the criminal defendant's race, it would seem that
the use of discriminatory practices by defense counsel would also
injure the rights of the excluded venirepersons. Lower courts have
applied the standards of Batson to defense counsel as well as pros-
ecutors. 10 5 However, the Supreme Court will not be able to extend
its rationale to defense counsel as easily as these lower courts. This
is because those courts have relied on the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury comprised of a cross-section of the community, as well as
state constitutions.
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court based its decisions
in Batson and Powers on the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Any attempt to apply a constitutional provi-
sion designed to limit State's powers upon an individual (e.g. de-
fense counsel) could possibly result in judicial uproar and
constitutional challenges. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no State shall . ..deny to
104. Id. at 1372-73.
105. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P. 2d 748, 765 (Cal. 1978); Commonwealth v.
Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 517 n.35 (Mass. 1977).
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any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."' 6 To prove a violation of the equal protection clause, one
must show "state action, 10 7 such as that of a prosecutor using pe-
remptory challenges to discriminate. Because a criminal defense
attorney does not represent state interests or state power, it would
seem difficult to extend the holding in Powers to defense counsel's
actions.
Therefore, if the Court intends to make defense counsel sub-
ject to the same peremptory challenge restrictions regarding race
as the prosecution, they will have to do so outside of Powers and
the Equal Protection Clause. However, as the majority in Batson
mentioned, three distinct groups are injured by the discriminatory
jury selection procedures: the accused, the excluded juror, and the
entire community. °8 When the focus shifts from discrimination
against the accused to discrimination against the excluded juror
and the entire community, the need for the Court to make defense
counsel subject to the same peremptory challenge restrictions as to
race becomes magnified. This could be accomplished by applying
the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution as state courts
have done. 10 9 The Court could do this by holding that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a right to have a jury drawn from a cross-
section of the population within the jurisdiction of the Court."0
2. Other Minorities
Swain mentions the exclusion of minority groups other than
blacks."' However, Powers fails to answer the question of whether
its holding will apply to other minorities other than blacks. The
Court has yet to determine whether its use of the words "black,"
"white," and "race" will allow defendants from other minority
groups to allege and prove discriminatory practices by the prosecu-
tion during the jury selection process in a criminal trial."2
"Race" is defined as "[a]n ethical stock; a great division of
mankind having in common certain distinguishing physical pecu-
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 6 (1883).
108. Note, Batson v. Kentucky: One Step Short of Halting The Discrimina-
tory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 TOL. L. REv. 267, 282 (1989).
109. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
110. Id. at 754-58.
111. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221-22 (Ala. 1965).
112. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991).
1992]
13
Hornthal: Another Step Towards Ending Discrimination in the Jury Selection
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
liarities constituting a comprehensive class appearing to be derived
from a distinct primitive source. ' 13 Following this definition of
race it seems that all ethnic minorities would be protected by the
Powers decision.
In addition, Powers fails to discuss the use of peremptory
challenges to discriminate against female venirepersons when the
criminal defendant is a woman. The Court in Powers does not dis-
cuss this problem, even in dicta. It appears that "sex" will not fall
into the Powers racial discrimination analysis. This is because judi-
cial decisions and legislation in the past have dealt with sexual dis-
crimination separately from racial discrimination.11' However,
women are also protected under the Equal Protection Clause, and
this question is open for later Court review.
V. CONCLUSION
Powers v. Ohio held that under the Equal Protection Clause, a
criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors
through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and
the excluded jurors share the same race. 15 This case marks the
continuation of the slow movement to remove discrimination from
the jury selection process that began with the Civil Rights Act of
1875 and continued through the Batson v. Kentucky decision in
1986. Powers marks another step towards protecting the rights of
criminal defendants, jurors, and the community at large.
Despite this, Powers stopped short of forbidding the discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges completely. The same inter-
ests and considerations that support the holding in Powers apply
equally to preventing the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges by defense counsel.1 6 In addition, the interest of criminal
defendants, prospective jurors, and the community at large would
be better served if Powers were broadened to offer protection to
other racial minorities and women. However, the decision is a just
continuation of the process to remove discrimination from jury se-
113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1132 (5th ed. 1979).
114. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
115. Note, Batson v. Kentucky: One Step Short of Halting The Discrimina-
tory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 TOL. L. REV. 267 (1989).
116. See Powers, 111 S. Ct. 1364.
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lection. Perhaps one day soon, cases will appear before the Court
which will mandate that discrimination in the process of jury selec-
tion will be totally eradicated.
L. Phillip Hornthal, III
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